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Toner: Procedural Considerations in the Judicial Determination of Water

COMMENTS
PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE JUDICIAL
DETERMINATION OF WATER DISPUTES*
An appropriative water right has been defined as an exclusive right to use water appropriated according to the law
and applied to a beneficial use.' Suits to protect these rights
have taken many different forms in Wyoming. These include
actions seeking quiet title relief ;2 declaratory judgments ;3

damages ;' injunctions to prevent wrongful diversions ;' writs
of mandamus' and mandatory7 and preventives injunctions

against water officials; and declarations of abandonment of
water rights. Of course, the relief requested by some plaintiffs includes a combination of these different remedies."0
The purpose of this comment is to examine the procedural
problems relating to jurisdiction, parties, pleadings, and
forms of relief which arise in water disputes.
JUMDICTION

A. Quiet Title, Declaratory Judgment, and Abandonment.
1. Power.
Wyoming Statute § 1-958 provides that a possessor of
real property may bring an action to determine the interests
of adverse claimants in the property. Since a water right is
real property, 1 a quiet title action can be brought under this
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

*This comment was financed by the Water Resources Research Institute of
the University of Wyoming.
Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110, 61 P. 258, 265 (1900); 2
KINNEY, IRRIGATION & WATER RIGHTS 1813 (2d ed. 1912).
Wheatland Irrigation Dist. v. Dodge, 387 P.2d 679 (Wyo. 1963); Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter, 8ufra note 1.
Big Goose & Beaver Ditch Co. v. Wallop, 382 P.2d 388 (Wyo. 1963).
Van Buskirk v. Red Buttes Land & Livestock Co., 24 Wyo. 183, 156 P. 1122
(1916).
Bales v. Ankney, 382 P.2d 386 (Wyo. 1963).
State ez rel. Mitchell Irrigation Dist. v. Parshall, 22 Wyo. 818, 140 P. 830
(1914).
Mitchell Irrigation Dist. v. Whiting, 59 Wyo. 52, 136 P.2d 502 (1943).
Condict v. Ryan, 79 Wyo. 211, 333 P.2d 684 (1958); Merrill v. Bishop, 74
Wyo. 298, 287 P.2d 620 (1955).
Yentzer v. Hemenway, 440 P.2d 7 (Wyo. 1968).
The plaintiff sought an injunction, damages, and quiet title relief in
Wheatland Irrigation Dist. v. Dodge, 387 P.2d 679 (Wyo. 1963).
King v. White, 499 P.2d 585 (Wyo. 1972); KINNEY, 8upra note 1, at 1329;
TRETLEASE, BLOOMENTHAL & GERAUD, CASES & MATERIALS ON NATURAL RESOURCES 69 (1965).
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statute.1" A suit to quiet title is not subject to easy classification in terms of in rem, quasi in rem, or in personam actions. One author has classified the Wyoming quiet title
proceeding as being quasi in rem."8 This classification appears
to be correct. A quasi in rem. proceeding adjudicates the rights
of only certain named defendants to property rather than
the interests of all persons who might claim an interest in
the property as is the case in a pure in rem action. 4 Wyoming's quiet title action will only bind certain named defendants and their unknown heirs, devisees, and legatees."
Since the Wyoming quiet title action is a quasi in rem
proceeding, a Wyoming court will have power to quiet title to
a water right only if the situs of the right is in Wyoming."
The general rule appears to be that the situs of an appropriative water right is the place of diversion and not the place of
use.' Therefore, the situs problem will arise only when the
water is diverted in one state and used in another.
The Wyoming Supreme Court was confronted by this
issue in Willey v. Decker'8 in which a suit was brought to
determine priorities on a Montana-Wyoming stream. One
of the defendants diverted water in Montana and used it in
Wyoming. One of the plaintiffs diverted water in Wyoming
and used it in Montana. The court held that Wyoming courts
had the power to adjudicate defendant's right to the stream,
apparently because the lands irrigated by that right were
in Wyoming. However, the court refused to hold that Wyoming courts could adjudicate the plaintiff's right simply because he diverted water in Wyoming. This result seems to
indicate that Wyoming rejects the general situs rule and will
12. Kinney states that the general rule is that since a water right is real property, a quiet title action is proper. 3 KINNEY, IRRIGATION & WATER RIGHTS
2763 (2d ed. 1912).
13. Note, Enhancing the Marketability of Land: The Suit to Quiet Title, 68
YALE L.J. 1245, 1265 (1959).
14. Note, Developments in the Law: State Court Jurisdiction,73 HAIV. L. REV.
909, 949 (1960).
15. Wyo. R. Civ. P. 4(h).
16. Willey v. Decker, 11 Wyo. 496, 73 P. 210, 224 (1903); KINNEY, supra note
12, at 2760. An action to quiet title to water rights is also a local, not a
transitory action. 6 CLARK, WATERS & WATER RIGHTS § 511.1, at 289 (1972).
17. West End Irrigation Co. v. Garvey, 117 Colo. 109, 184 P.2d 476 (1947);
Turley v. Furman, 16 N.M. 253, 114 P. 278 (1911) ; WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN
THE WESTERN STATES § 344, at 370 (3d ed. 1911).
18. 11 Wyo. 496, 73 P. 210 (1903).
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hold that the situs of a water right is the place of use and
not the place of diversion.
Since a water right is simply a right to use water, it has
no situs in the sense that tangible property has. Therefore,
the courts necessarily act somewhat arbitrarily in selecting
either the place of use or the place of diversion as the situs
of the right."9 Neither convenience nor fairness appear to
dictate that one or the other be chosen. For example, interstate disputes of this nature normally arise between appropriators in contiguous states. There is usually, therefore, no
problem with forcing a defendant to travel great distances
in order to litigate.
The place of diversion situs is supported by the argument
that the water right is in a sense represented by a certificate
of appropriation issued by the state in which the diversion
occurs.2 ° The Restatement of Conflicts adopts the rule that
a state has power to exercise jurisdiction to affect interests
in intangible things embodied in a document which is within
the state."' The place of use situs is supported by the argument that the right is not perfected until it is applied to a
beneficial use and that the injury occurs to the land on which
the water is used. Since both states have an interest in the
water right, a possible solution may be to define the situs of
the water right as either the place of diversion or the place
of use. There would then be concurrent jurisdiction in the
two states, and the first state in which an action to quiet title
is brought should proceed to determine the case without interference by the courts of the other state.
Rickey Land and Cattle Co. v. Miller and Lux2 2 indicates
that this approach may be correct. In this case A, who diverted water in Nevada, sued B in a Nevada court to enjoin
B from diverting water in California to the injury of A's
lands in Nevada. B, who had lands in California, then instituted a suit in California to quiet title to this water right.
The Supreme Court held that there was concurrent jurisdic19. Andrews, Situs of Intangibles in Suits Against Nonresident Claimants,
49 YALE L.J. 241 (1940).
20. WYO. STAT. § 41-211 (1957).
21.

RESTATEMENT

(SEcoND)

OF CONFLICTS § 63 (1971).

22. 218 U.S. 258 (1910).
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tion in the two courts and that the issues in the two suits
were so much the same that the "court first seized should
proceed wihout interference. "" The California court was
enjoined from hearing the quiet title action.
Since a quiet title action is essentially an action for declaratory relief, 4 the quiet title jurisdiction requirements
would also apply to declaratory judgment actions in which the
plaintiff seeks a determination of the relative rights to water.
An abandonment proceeding, like a quiet title action, involves
the determination of title to or the status of property located
within the court's jurisdiction. Therefore, abandonment proceedings also appear to be quasi in Tem proceedings and subject to these procedural considerations.
2. Competence and Venue.
Since the Wyoming district courts are courts of general
jurisdiction, competence or jurisdiction over the subject matter will be established once the situs of the water right is determined to be in Wyoming for power purposes. 251 Wyoming
Statute § 1-30 provides that actions for "the recovery of real
property, or of an estate or interest therein" must be brought
in the county in which the subject of the action is situated. Generally this will again require a determination of the situs of
the water right. Willey may indicate that the place of use
determines the situs for venue as well as power purposes. It
seems, however, that there will generally be no compelling
reason for selecting the place of use over the place of diversion and that situs for the purpose of the venue statute should
be either where the water is diverted or where it is used.2"
Depending upon the nature of the quiet title action, the
situs of the water rights may not always determine the appropriate venue for the action. For example, Ohio, the law of
origin for Wyoming's venue statute, has held that an action
by a plaintiff, who was in possession of and had legal title
to real property, to cancel a recorded mechanic's lien against
23. Id. at 262. For a case which follows the holding in Rickey see Brooks v.
United States, 119 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1941).
24. Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyo. Agency, 63 Wyo. 187, 179 P.2d 773, 780 (1947).
25.

WYO. CONST. art 5, § 10.

26. CLARK, supra note 16, at § 511.2.
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the property was not an action to recover real property or
an interest therein within the meaning of the venue statute.2 7
B. Actions for Damages and Injunctions.
1. Local-Transitory Actions.
The local-transitory distinction raises difficult problems
in this area. It should be noted that some authorities classify
the local-transitory problem as a venue question, which means
that it is waivable.2" Others, however, treat the problem as
one of jurisdiction which cannot be waived. 9
The majority rule is that suits for injuries to real property must be brought in the state in which the property is
situated. 0 This requirement has been severely criticized,3 '
and the rule has been rejected in several states."2 In addition
it has generally only been applied to actions for damages to
land although it is often phrased in terms of real property.3
Kinney indicates that the local action rule also applies to
actions for damages for injuries to water rights.3 " It seems,
however, that the mere fact that water rights are classified
as real property should not lead to an automatic application
of the rule to in personam actions for damages or injunctions.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has apparently rejected
the local action rule as it applies to suits for injuries to
water rights. It adopted the general rule that where personal
jurisdiction is obtained over the defendant, an in personam
action for damages or an injunction will lie even though the
situs of the water right is in another state. 5 It held in Willey
that if the defendant is before the court, then the court can
assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant in an action
27. Gustafson v. Buckley, 161 Ohio St. 160, 118 N.E.2d 403 (1954).
28. Comment, Local Actions in the Federal Courts, 70 HARv. L. REV. 708, 718
(1957).
29. Moore indicates that the true distinction between local and transitory is
the distinction between in rem and in personam proceedings. 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 1455-6 (1972).
80. Id. at 1461.
31. Id. at 1455-6.
32. See, e.g., Reasor-Hill Corp. v. Harrison, 220 Ark. 521, 249 S.W.2d 994
(1952); Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 1219 (1953); Annot., 42 A.L.R. 196 (1926).
33. MOORE, supra note 29.
84. 3 KINNEY, IRRIGATION & WATER RIGHTS 3101 (2d ed. 1912).
35. CL4nK, supra note 16, at 291-92.
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for wrongful interference with a water right if the wrongful act or the resulting injury occurred in this state."5
If the wrongful diversion occurs in Wyoming, then the
wrongful act occurred in this state, and there is jurisdiction
even though the plaintiff's place of use and diversion are
located outside this state. If the defendant wrongfully diverts
water outside Wyoming, and deprives Wyoming lands of
the water, Wyoming courts still have jurisdiction because
the resulting injury occurs in this state. Finally, if a plaintiff
diverts water in Wyoming and uses it outside the state and if
he is wrongfully deprived of that water by defendant's diversion outside the state, Wyoming also has jurisdiction. In
Willey the court reasoned that the plaintiff has a right to
have the water flow downstream to his headgate. This right
is located in Wyoming, and if that right is interfered with
by an upstream appropriator, an injury occurs in this state."
2. Power.
The defendant must be served with process before the
court can assert personal jurisdiction over him. The preceding discussion of local-transitory actions, of course, assumed
that the defendant was before the court either because he was
served within the state, waived his objections to the power of
the court, or came before the court by some other means. If
the defendant is a nonresident, serious problems may arise in
securing personal jurisdiction.
The Wyoming long arm statute has remedied many of
these problems.8 8 Personal jurisdiction can be obtained over
a nonresident defendant by service outside the state in the
following situations:
1. The defendant wrongfully diverts water in Wyoming
(even though he uses it outside the state), and this diversion
deprives the plaintiff's Wyoming lands or his means of diversion located in Wyoming" of water. Such action would constitute tortious injury by an act done in this state."0
36.
37.
38.
39.

Willey v. Decker, 11 Wyo. 496, 73 P. 210, 224 (1903).
Id. at 225.
WYO. STAT. §§ 5-4.1 to -4.3 (Supp. 1971).
See Willey v. Decker, supra note 36, holding that such action causes an
injury in this state.
40. WYo. STAT. § 5-4.2(a) (iii) (Supp. 1971).
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2. The defendant diverts water outside the state. The
water is used by the defendant in Wyoming, and this diversion deprives the plaintiff's Wyoming lands or means of
diversion of water. The claim for relief arises from an injury
caused by a tortious act outside the state, and the defendant's
use of the wrongfully diverted water on Wyoming lands
seems to constitute engaging in a "persistent course of conduct in this state" which causes tortious injury in Wyoming."
If the defendant diverts and uses the water outside Wyoming, then the long arm statute does not permit service outside the state in order to obtain personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. In this case the defendant would lack sufficient
minimum contacts with Wyoming to justify out of state
personal service.
3. Competence and Venue.
The Wyoming district courts are, of course, competent
to hear these suits because they are the courts of general jurisdiction in the state.2 If the suit is styled in the form of an
ejectment action43 for the recovery of real property, the action
would have to be brought in the county in which the water
right is situated." This again involves a determination of
the situs of the right. It appears, therefore, that it may be
desirable in some situations to avoid the ejectment form of
action in order to eliminate the situs problem.
An injunction against wrongful diversion would have the
same effect as ejectment and would be a superior alternative
from the venue standpoint. If damages or an injunction are
sought against a nonresident defendant, the action may be
brought for venue purposes where the cause of action arose
or where the plaintiff resides. 5
It may, however, be difficult to determine where the
cause of action arose when the water was wrongfully diverted
by the defendant in one county and injury resulted to lands
41. WYo. STAT. § 5-4.2(a) (iv) (Supp. 1971).
42. WYO. CONST. art. 5, § 10.
43. WYo. STAT. § 1-959 (1957). As is shown below, this form of action is
probably not correct.
44. WYo. STAT. § 1-30(1) (1957).
45. Wyo. STAT. § 1-36 (1957).
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situated in another county. It has been suggested that neither
the diversion alone nor the injury alone is sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the person diverting the water.
Therefore, since the cause of action arose partly in each
county, the plaintiff could properly bring the action in
either county."
PRIMARY JURISDICTION

This subject has been more exhaustively treated in a
prior volume of this law review ;4 however, a brief summary
of this doctrine will be given here. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction provides that where a court and an administrative agency have concurrent jurisdiction over a question, the
issue should be initially determined by the administrative
agency."8 This doctrine affects Wyoming water law because
it will determine whether certain proceedings should be initiated before the courts or the State Engineer and the Board
of Control.
In Kearney Lake, Land & Reservoir Co. v. Lake DeSmet
Reservoir Co." the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the
Board of Control has primary jurisdiction over abandonment
of water rights.5" In determining whether the primary jurisdiction doctrine should be applied to a particular question,
consideration should be given to the following factors: (1)
the Board's expertise, (2) the desirability of uniformity of
decisions, (3) coordination of efforts between the Board and
the courts, (4) whether a question of law or fact is involved,
(5) expense and delay, and (6) whether the Board can grant
the relief requested."
46. Deseret Irrigation Co. v. McIntyre, 16 Utah 398, 52 P. 628 (1898); Willey
v. Decker, supra note 36, at 224; CLARK, supra note 16, at 294.
47. Note, 'Water Law-Primary Jurisdiction of the Board of Control over
Questions of Water Rights. Kearney Lake, Land & Reservoir Co. v. Lake
DeSmret Reservoir Co., 487 P.2d 324 (Wyo. 1971), 7 LAND & WATER L. REv.

599 (1972).
48. DAviS, ADMINISTRATiVE LAW TEXT § 19.01, at 373 (1972).
49. 487 P.2d 324 (Wyo. 1971).
50. The proposed Wyoming Water Rights Act of 1973 (Working Draft #1,
Dee. 1971) Ch. 2, § 41, at 41-42 specifically provided that the Board of
Control shall have "exclusive original jurisdiction in water right abandonment proceedings."
51. Note, supra note 47, at 602-04.
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A. Suits against water officials.
Suits seeking an injunction or writ of mandamus against
a water offocial have been used in Wyoming. Some of these
are actually designed to determine water rights among private appropriators. For example, in Mitchell IrrigationDistrict v. Whiting,52 the plaintiff sought a mandatory injunction requiring the defendant water commissioner to prevent
diversion by certain upstream appropriators. The Wyoming
Supreme Court held that the water official was merely a
nominal party. The appropriators whose interests would be
damaged by an injunction issued against the water official
were held to be indispensable parties.
Mitchell was decided before the adoption of the Wyoming
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 19," however, seems to require a similar result. An appropriator who is not joined
would not be bound by a decision against the official. If the
official is ordered to stop the appropriator's diversion, as a
practical matter the appropriator's ability to protect his interest has been impaired. 4 A decree adverse to the water
official would have an injurious effect on the absent party's
interest.5
More importantly, a decision in the absence of the appropriator who would be adversely affected would subject the
water official to a substantial risk of incurring inconsistent
obligations. 6 If appropriator A sues the water commissioner
and obtains an order compelling him to close B's headgate
and B is not joined, then B could sue the commissioner in a
separate action and obtain an injunction preventing the water
official from closing the same headgate.
B. Suits between appropriators.
In a suit between appropriators, there generally would be
no need to join the water officials who administer the stream
52. 59 Wyo. 52, 136 P.2d 502 (1943).
53. WYo. R. Civ. P. 19.
54.

Wyo. R. Civ. P. 19 (a) (2) (i).

55. According to Am. Beryllium & Oil Corp. v. Chase, 425 P.2d 66 (Wyo. 1967),
this is one test of an indispensable party.
56. WYo. R. Civ. P. 19(a) (2) (ii).
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which is the subject of the dispute unless the water official
is interfering or threatening to interfere with the water. 7
The Wyoming practice appears to be not to join the water
officials." In a quiet title action, for example, where no right
of the state would be prejudiced by the court decree and failure to comply with statutory procedures is not an issue, there
would be no reason to join the state or the water officials."
C. Suits by Water Distribution Agencies.
The problem in this area is whether water distribution
agencies, such as mutual water companies and irrigation districts, can maintain actions against claimants to the water
diverted by the agency without joining its shareholders or
consumers.
The questions which cause the difficulties are: (1) who
owns the water right and, therefore, has a right to protect it,
and (2) what damage does the agency itself sustain by reason
of the wrongful diversion of water. One authority has stated,
"Whether the distributing agency or the consumer 'owns'
the water right often presents perplexing problems of semantics."6 He concludes, however, that the courts have adopted
a variety of theories so that in most states
in external relationships between the project and
other claimants to the water, the distributing agency
is regarded as the 'proprietor of the appropriation',
but internally, between the distributor and the consumer, the consumer has property rights that the
court will protect from arbitrary action by the dis-

tributor. 1

Wyoming's system of granting a primary permit to the
agency to divert and store the water and a secondary permit
57. Clark, however, states that if a stream is being administered by a water
official, the official must generally be joined as a party, but his position
does not appear to be supported by the cases which he cites. For example,
he cites: Koch v. Whitten, 140 Colo. 109, 342 P.2d 1011 (1959); Reynolds
v. W.S. Ranch Co., 69 N.M. 169, 364 P.2d 1036 (1961); and Calderwood
v. Young, 212 Ore. 197, 315 P.2d 561 (1957). In these cases the water
official was either the sole defendant or the sole plaintiff. They did not
involve the propriety of joining the official in essentially private disputes.
CLARK, supra note 16, at 296-97.
58. See, e.g., Van Buskirk v. Red Buttes Land & Livestock Co., supra note 4 in
which damages were sought; and Wheatland Irrigation District v. Dodge,
Spr0' note 2, in which the plaintiff sought to quiet title to the water rights.
59. Hudson v. West, 47 Cal. App. 2d 823, 306 P.2d 807, 808 (1957).
60. TRELEASE, 8upra note 11, at 263.
61. Id. at 264.
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to the consumer to apply the water to beneficial use gives the
agency rights in the water which it can enforce against adverse claimants.6 2 In addition where the water distribution
agency has been adjudicated a water right or was organized
by consumers transferring their rights to the agency in exchange for shares in the agency's rights," the agency is the
holder of the water right. There appears to be no conceptual
difficulty in allowing the agency to sue to protect that right.6 4
While the issue has not been decided in Wyoming, the
general rule is that a water distribution agency can, without
joining its consumers, maintain an action to adjudicate water
rights, to quiet title to water rights, or to obtain injunctive
relief against adverse claimants. 5 However, when the agency
seeks damages, the courts have split over the question of
joinder.
The Utah Supreme Court held in Gunnison-Fayette
Canal Co. v. Gunnison IrrigationCo. 6 that a nonprofit mutual water company, which was the holder of a water right,
could sue for the value of the water which had been wrongfully diverted by the defendant. It could not sue for the
damage to the shareholder's crops," and all amounts recovered
were to be held in trust for its shareholders. This result seems
to be unsatisfactory for two reasons.
First, this result may subject a defendant to a multiplicity of suits. If the consumers are not to go uncompensated for their individual damages, they must also be entitled
to sue the defendant. The wrongdoer could be sued by the
distributing agency and by each consumer, yet each case
would involve the proof of the same facts with variations
only in the area of damages. Under the Utah holding, the
62. Wyo. STAT. § 41-26 to -27 (1957).
63. TRELEASE, supra note 11, at 257.
64. If the company, such as a carrier ditch, owns only the physical distribution
works, then it cannot sue claimants to water which its consumer are entitled
to use. TRELEAsE, supra note 11, at 264.
65. See Annot., 100 A.L.R. 561 (1936). There are cases in Wyoming in which
the water distribution agency has sued without joining its consumers and
shareholders. See, e.g., Kearney Lake, Land & Reservoir Co. v. Lake
DeSmet Co., 487 P.2d 324 (Wyo. 1971); Mitchell Irrigation Dist. v. Whiting,
59 Wyo. 52, 136 P.2d 502 (1943).
66. 22 Utah 2d 45, 448 P.2d 707 (1968).
67. This followed the court's holding in Salt Lake City v. E. Jordan Irrigation
Co., 40 Utah 126, P. 593 (1911).
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consumers are certainly not indispensable parties and apparently are not even necessary parties. Therefore, there appears
to be no means of guaranteeing that the defendant would not
be subjected to a variety of actions for one wrongful act.
Secondly, there is some conceptual difficulty with the
measure of damages in this case. The company is awarded
the value of the water wrongfully diverted. The company
does not, however, own the corpus of the water; rather it only
has a right to divert and use a specific quantity." The damages should be measured by the impact of the interference
on the company's use of the water. Of course, the company
itself does not apply the water to a beneficial use and
theoretically should not be entitled to damages.
It seems that Utah's resolution of this problem is unsatisfactory. It also seems that those courts which allow the
company to seek equitable relief without joining the consumers are inconsistent when they deny the company the
right to sue for damages for the individual injuries suffered
by their shareholders."' Their real complaint is that since
the company has suffered no damage itself, it is not a real
party in interest in a damage suit."
The real party in interest requirement is designed to
require the action to be brought by the person who, according
to the governing substantive law, is entitled to enforce the
right." If the water company has the right to enforce the
substantive right in an equity action, it should also have the
right to protect that interest in other ways. The action need
not necessarily be brought in the name of the person who will
ultimately benefit from the recovery. 2 The courts which require that the consumers be joined overlook this factor.
Rule 17 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure states
that a "trustee of an express trust .. .may sue in his own
68. See Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 265; 1 WiEL, WATER
RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES 730 (3d ed. 1911).
69. Farmer's Independent Ditch Co. v. Agricultural Ditch Co., 22 Colo. 513, 45
P. 444 (1896) (allowed the irrigation company to sue to determine priorities). Eaton v. Larimer & Weld Reservoir Co., 3 Colo. 366, 33 P. 278 (1893)
(denied reservoir company the right to collect on a bond for damage to
shareholders' crops).
70. Nev. Ditch Co. v. Pac. Livestock Co., 63 Ore. 363, 127 P. 984 (1912).
71. Wyo. Wool Marketing Ass'n. v. Urruty, 394 P.2d 905 (Wyo. 1964).
72.

6 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 644 (1971).
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name without joining with him the party for whose benefit
the action is brought." 73 It has been suggested that the water
distribution agency holds legal title to the water, and the
consumers hold equitable title so that there is a trustee-beneficiary relationship between the agency and the consumer."4
While this may not be truly a trust so as to come within the
phrase "a trustee of an express trust", the relationship is
similar to a trust arrangement. Since the specific enumerations of those who are real parties in interest in Rule 17 are
merely illustrations of the rule,7" and the agency-consumer
relationship is so similar to the trustee-beneficiary relationship, the agency should be treated as the real party in interest.
When the water right has been adjudicated to the corporation, some type of trust theory justification would probably be worked out in any event in order to allow the consumer to sue. Unless the conumer has some type of interest
or equitable title, he could not sue to protect a xight "owned"
by the corporate entity.
This problem could be avoided if the water distribution
agency was obligated to indemnify its consumers for any loss
of water caused by wrongful diversion or if its articles provided for an assignment of the consumers' claims to the corporation. Even the courts which require joinder appear to
recognize these exceptions."
PLEADING AND FORMS OF ACTION

Rule 8(a) (1) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that the pleading set forth a short, plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The
purpose of this section is to determine of what that statement
should consist.
A. Quiet Title.
The minimum requirements of pleading in a quiet title
action are that the plaintiff allege: (1) he is in possession of
73. Wyo. R. Crv. P. 17(a).
74. KINNEY, supra note 34, at 2662.
75. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 72, at 667.

76. See Nev. Ditch Co. v. Pac. Livestock Co., supra note 70; Gunnison-Fayette

Canal Co. v. Gunnison Irrigation Co., supra note 66, at 709 (Henriod dissenting).
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a described water right, (2) he is the owner in fee simple of
the water right, (3) the defendant claims an estate or interest
in the water right which is adverse to the plaintiff, and (4)
the defendant has no estate, right, title or interest whatsoever in the water right.77
Some problem may be created by the possession requirement when tbhe defendant is not merely asserting a claim but
has already diverted the water. The plaintiff is then deprived
of the use of the water, and his situation is comparable to a
landowner who is deprived of the use of his land by a third
person's seizure of possession. It seems that in this situation
a quiet title action may not be appropriate and that it is only
proper so long as the plaintiff is using the water and the defendant is simply asserting an adverse claim. The Wyoming
court has, however, stated that the possession requirement is
based on the availability of full protection to the plaintiff
through an action in ejectment or its statutory substitute. 8
Where legal remedies are inadequate, the Wyoming court has
dispensed with the possession requirement in quiet title actions. In Chesney v. Valley Live Stock Co.7" the court held a
mortgagee not in possession could bring a quiet title action
to cancel a quit claim deed as a cloud on title because there
was no adequate remedy at law. As is shown below, the common law action of ejectment and the Wyoming statutory
substitute are not available alternatives in a water Tights
dispute. Therefore, a quiet title action may be appropriate
even though the defendant has already diverted the plaintiff's water.
The possession and other procedural difficulties which
are inherent in a quiet title action may, however, be avoided
by bringing a declaratory judgment action.
B. Abandonment.
In order to obtain a declaration of abandonment of a
water xight, the pleader should allege: (1) the defendant
failed to use the water for beneficial purposes for five succes77. Hunziker v. Knowlton, 78 Wyo. 241, 324 P.2d 266 (1958); WYo. STAT. § 1958 (1957). See WYo. R. CIv. P. Form 16.
78. Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyo. Agency, 63 Wyo. 187, 179 P.2d 773, 779 (1947).
79. 34 Wyo. 378, 244 P. 216 (1926).
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sive years, 0 (2) the abandonment was effected by the defendant's voluntary act, 8 ' and (3) the plaintiff is the owner of
an appropriation of water that would be appreciably benefitted by a declaration of abandonment. 2
C. Suits against water officials.
In Le Beau v. State of Wyoming ex rel. White"3 the
plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus compelling the water
commissioner to regulate the controlling works of a reservoir
in accordance with the priorities existing upon the Rock
Creek watershed and to distribute such water as a part of the
natural waters of Rock Creek. The commissioner had released the reservoir water into another watershed. The court
denied the writ on two grounds: (1) There was a serious
dispute over whether the water had been illegally impounded,
and a writ of mandamus will issue only where the right sought
to be enforced is "clear and certain, so as not to admit to any
reasonable controversy." 4 (2) The plaintiffs failed to how
that they had no plain and adequate remedy at law since the
courts could pass on the question of illegal impoundment in
an "ordinary suit."
The writ of mandamus appears to be proper only where
the duty to be performed is ministerial, and the obligation is
peremptory and clearly defined, and there is no adequate
remedy at law. It will be appropriate in those cases where
a plaintiff asks not that a decision be made one way or the
other but only that a decision be made. 7 This was the situas
tion in State ex rel. Mitchell IrrigationDistrict v. Parshall
in which the Board of Control refused to even pass on the
80. WYO. STAT. § 41-47 (1957).
81. Ramsay v. Gottsche, 51 Wyo. 516, 69 P.2d 585 (1937). It is not necessary
to allege or prove that the defendant intended to abandon the water right.
Ward v. Yoder, 355 P.2d 371 (Wyo. 1960). It is, however, a defense to
abandonment if nonuser is caused by facts not under the appropriator's

control. Yentzer v. Hemenway, 440 P.2d 7, 13 (Wyo. 1968).
82. Horse Creek Conservation Dist. v. Lincoln Land Co., 54 Wyo. 320, 92 P.2d
572 (1939).
83. 377 P.2d 302 (Wyo. 1963).
84. Id. at 303.
85. While a writ of mandamus is a legal remedy, the court issuing it is controlled by equitable principles. State ex rel. Cross v. Bd. of Land Comm'rs,
50 Wyo. 181, 58 P.2d 423 (1936).

86. Le Beau v. State of Wyo. ex rel. White, supra note 83.
87. Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 184 (1925).
88. 22 Wyo.318, 140 P. 830 (1914).
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plaintiff's proofs of appropriation in order to determine
whether the plaintiff had a water right. The court issued the
writ compelling the Board to pass upon the plaintiff's proofs
because the plaintiff was not asking that he be granted a
water right but only that the water official be required to
perform his statutory duty of reviewing the applications for
a permit.
On the basis of this case, it appears that the petition for
the writ should state facts showing: (1) the applicant has an
interest in obtaining this writ, (2) he has complied with all
conditions precedent to demanding official action, (3) there
was a clearly defined, indisputable legal duty resting on the
respondent to take certain action,89 (4) the official or board
was guilty of a breach of this duty or an abuse of discretion,
And (5) the petitioner has no plain and adequate remedy at
law."
An attempt may be made to avoid some of the stringent
requirements of the writ of mandamus by seeking instead a
mandatory injunction against the water official. However,
a mandatory injunction issued to compel an official to perform a duty imposed by law is identical in its function and
purpose to a writ of mandamus." Different criteria should
not govern their availability in this area. The issuance of an
injunction to restrain the official from performing an injurious act is governed by the same equitable principles that
govern the issuance of any injunction.9 2
D. Tort actions.
1. In general.
If a plaintiff seeks damages for a wrongful interference
with his water right, his pleading will be sufficient if it alleges
facts showing: (1) he is the owner of a certain described"
89. State ex rel. Whitehead v. Gage, 377 P.2d 299, 800 (Wyo. 1963).
90. LeBeau v. State of Wyo. ex rel. White, supra note 83, at 304, indicates that
not only must the traditional legal remedies be inadequate but equitable
remedies, such as injunctions, must also be inadequate.
91. Moody v. Transylvania County, 271 N.C. 384, 156 S.E.2d 716, 720 (1967);
Bd. of Managers v. City of Wilmington, 235 N.C. 597, 70 S.E.2d 833 (1952).
92. The requirements for an injunction are discussed below.
93. The plaintiffs should allege in "clear and concise language plaintiffs are
the owners of the water rights in question." Hunziker v. Knowlton, 78 Wyo.
241, 324 P.2d 266 (1958).
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right to use water,9 ' (2) the defendant has wrongfully interfered with this right, (3) the defendant's actions are the
proximate cause of this interference, and (4) the plaintiff is
thereby injured. 5 This claim for relief appears to have its
roots in the common law form of action of trespass on the
case. This action lay to protect injuries to solely intangible
rights, such as a water right.9" The nature of the action required the allegations of xight, duty, breach, and proximate
cause.9 The modern requirements are similar.
2. Ejectment.
At common law ejectnent would not lie to recover intangible real property, such as in incorporeal hereditament,
a water course, or a natural stream. 8 A water right has been
held to be an incorporeal hereditament by the Wyoming
court.9 In Allen v. Houn.0 the court also stated that the
Wyoming ejectment... statute is the same in substance as the
common law ejectment action and is simply stripped of the
fictions and technicalities of pleadings which it involved. 1" 2
It appears, therefore, that an action to recover a water right
based on the Wyoming ejectment statute is not technically
proper even though the defendant has diverted all of the
plaintiff's water and applied it to his own use."'
94.

95.

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

102.
103.

Clark suggests that it is desirable to allege the basic elements of the water
right, .e., (1) The quantity of water appropriated; (2) The source; (3)
The priority date of appropriation as related to other rights and priorities;
(4) The point of diversion; (5) The nature of the use or the purpose to
which the right of use applies; (6) The time, period, or season when the
right of use exists; and (7) The place of use. He also states that it is
good practice to refer to the water right by number if there is a certificate
of appropriation and to incorporate the certificate by reference. 6 CLARK,
WATERS & WATER RIGHTS 302 (1972).
See, e.g., the statement of the pleadings in Campbell v. Wyo. Development
Co., 55 Wyo. 347, 100 P.2d 124 (1940); Van Buskirk v. Red Buttes Land
& Livestock Co., 24 Wyo. 183, 156 P. 1122 (1916); Gustin v. Harding, 20
Wyo. 1, 121 P. 522 (1912) ; Stoner v. Mau, 11 Wyo. 366, 72 P. 193 (1903).
See also CLARK, supra note 94, at 301; KINNEY, supra note 34, at 3108-09.
CRIBBET, JUDICLAL REMEDIES 42 (1954).
SHIPMAN, COMMON LAW PLEADING 214 (1923).
KINNEY, supra note 34, at 3039; SHIPMAN, supra note 97, at 177.
Frank v. Hicks, 4 Wyo. 502, 35 P. 475, 481 (1894).
30 Wyo. 186 219 P. 573 (1923).
WYO. STAT. § 1-959 (1957).
Allen v. Houn, supra note 100, at 578, 581.
The determination of the correct form of action is important for the purposes of the statute of limitations. Wyo. Stat. § 1-13 (1957) provides a
ten year period for actions to recover title or possession of lands, tenements, or hereditament. Since Frank v .Hicks, supra note 99 stated that
a water right is an incorporeal hereditament, the period of limitations
should be ten years even if ejectment is not a proper remedy.
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3. Nuisance.
A private nuisance is a non-trespassory interference with
This
a person's private use and enjoyment of his land.'
interwrongful
suits
for
form of action seems well adapted to
ference with appropriative water rights. This is shown by the
situations in which an upstream junior appropriator wrongfully diverts water which would otherwise reach a downstream
senior appropriator or pollutes the water so as to render it
unusable. While each appropriator is entitled to divert a
certain quantity and quality of water,' the senior appropriator is not entitled to the possession of any particular corpus
of water until it is running in his diversion works.' 8 Therefore, the junior's interference appears to be non-trespassory
since it is not incidental to and does not result from an unprivileged entry or intrusion on the plaintiff's land. 0 7 In
addition the senior's right to use the water for the purpose
for which the appropriation was made has been impaired.
The Wyoming court appears to have adopted the Restatement of Torts criteria for determining what constitutes a
private nuisance." 8 The Restatement's rule is that there is no
liability under the nuisance theory unless the non-trespassory
invasion of another's private use and enjoyment of land is
intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and the product
of negligent, reckless, or ultra-hazardous conduct." 9 Where
the defendant's conduct is intentional but reasonable or entirely accidental, there is no liability.
The danger of the Restatement's language can be seen
in the following situation: A large corporation which is the
entire economic base of a community requires an additional
cubic foot per second of water in order to conduct its operaRESTATEMENT

104.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 (1939);

107.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822, comment e (1939).

(SECOND)

OF TORTS

(Tent Draft No. 16) § 821D (1970). The court characterized the defendant's
wrongful diversion as a nuisance in Willey v. Decker, 11 Wyo. 496, 73 P.
210 (1903), and pollution caused by the defendant as a nuisance in Sussex
Land & Livestock Co. v. Midwest Refining Co., 294 F. 597 (8th Cir. 1923).
105. Arizona Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 230 U.S. 46, 57 (1913).
106. Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 265.
108. Schork v. Epperson, 74 Wyo. 286, 287 P.2d 467 (1955); Comment, The
Availability and Limitations of the Private Nuisance Doctrine in Wyoming,
7 LAND & WATER L. REV. 545 (1972).
109. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 (1939). The Wyoming court seemed to affirm
the fault criterion in nuisance actions in Lore v. Town of Douglas, 355 P.2d
367, 370 (Wyo. 1960).
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tions economically and stay in business. A small farmer is a
senior appropriator with an appropriation of one c.f.s. The
corporation, knowing that the farmer is a senior appropriator,
diverts the extra water, and the farmer's crops are destroyed.
This is an intentional act, and the next step under the Restatement's language is to determine if it is reasonable. This in
turn is determined by whether the utility of the actor's
conduct outweighs the gravity of the harm. 1 ' The preservation of the economic base of an entire community probably
outweighs the destruction of one farmer's crop. No court,
however, should allow the farmer to be deprived of his water
right without compensation. The Restatement's test would
appear to allow exactly this result because the interference is
intentional but reasonable."'
Professor Fleming James, Jr., however, contends that
the Restatement's position is against the weight of case
authority.1 ' He suggests that there should be liability if
substantial harm is caused by the intentional invasion of the
private use and enjoyment of land, even though the conduct
or condition causing the harm is socially useful, is maintained
with all due care, and is in a suitable, convenient location."13
In effect he would remove the requirement for finding fault
on the part of the defendant before characterizing his conduct
as a private nuisance. Instead in determining liability, it
would be only necessary to look to the impact of the defendant's actions on the plaintiff. In the above example, a determination that the small farmer would be substantially
harmed would lead to the corporation's liability.
James' approach would explicitly recognize that when a
junior appropriator causes substantial harm to a senior appropriator by a non-trespassory interference with the senior's
private use and enjoyment of land, he will be held strictly
110. RESTATEMENT OF ToRs § 826 (1939), applied in Schork v. Epperson, supra
note 108, at 470.
111. The courts have devised several means of avoiding such results. One of
these is the "conditional fault" concept. An activity is reasonable if compensation is paid and unreasonable if it is not. This, however, appears
to be a type of security blanket for those who are comfortable with a
theory of recovery only of the word "fault" is used. James, infra note 112.
112. James, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TOTS (Tent. Draft No. 16), Memo at
140 (1970).
113. Id.
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liable. The American Law Institute is apparently moving
toward this goal. Tentative Draft No. 17 still defines a
nuisance in terms of an intentional and unreasonable invasion,"' but the Institute has voted to include the following
provision: "Even though one's conduct is reasonable in the
sense that its social utility outweighs the harms and risks it
caues, he is subject to liability for damages, but not to an injunction."" 5 The corporation in the example would in effect
have the power of condemnation but not the power to steal.
The Wyoming court has followed the Restatement before,
and it seems appropriate for the court to reject the potentially
dangerous language of the first Restatement and adopt the
rule which leads to the result most courts will reach in any
event."'
RE=I_
A. Damages.
The function of compensatory damages is to place the
injured person as nearly as possible in the condition which he
would have been in if the wrong had not occurred." 7 This
section's purpose is to determine how that function is performed in water disputes.
The damages claimed for diversion of a natural
stream must be for the injury to the plaintiff's enterprise consequent to the loss of the flow and use
of the water, not for the value of the water at so
much per inch or gallon, since the plaintiff does not
own the corpus of the water, but a usufruct."'
Other authorities have taken the position that the measure
of damage in this area is the reasonable value of the water
taken." 9 Wiel's statement, however, seems to be the correct
approach to damages for wrongful interference with a water
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 17) § 822 (1971).
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 17) § 31 (1971).
116. Sussex Land & Livestock Co. v. Midwest Refining Co., 294 F. 597 (8th Cir.
1923), provides some authority for adopting this approach. The court
stated on page 604 that where water is rendered unfit for stock purposes
by pollution, the authorities are that an actionable wrong has occurred,
and "it is no defense that the cause of the pollution was a natural user of
land in a careful manner."
117. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 137 (1935).
118. WIEL, supra note 68, at 699.
119. CLARK, eupra note 16, at § 516.1.
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right. A water right is a right to use water, and the plaintiff
will be restored to his original condition before the wrong
if he is compensated for the injury to his land or business
caused by the wrongful interference.
If the taking is permanent or if seepage or pollution
causes permanent damage, the measure of damages is the
depreciation in the permanent value of the plaintiff's estate,
i.e., the difference between the market value of the land inmdiately before the injury and the value immediately
after. "' If crops are destroyed because of diversion or pollution, there is a split of authority over the measure of damages.
Some courts hold that the measure is the value of the crops
that would have been produced under ordinary conditions
less the expenses of producing and marketing a mature crop.' 1
Others state that such damage is too speculative and hold that
the measure is the difference between the rental value of the
land with water and its rental value without water.1 22 Sussex Land and Livestock Co. v. Midwest Refining Co."' upheld
a trial court's award of damages to pasture land caused by
pollution of water equal to the difference in the rental value
of the land with the pollution and the rental value without
the pollution.
B. Injunction.
In order to obtain an injunction, the plaintiff must first
show that he has a valid right to use a specified quantity of
water'. and that an injunction will benefit him.' 2' Of course,
the prerequisite of no adequate remedy at law must be met," 6
and the remedy at law is inadequate if the injured party will
120. CLAuK, supra note 16, at § 516.1; KINNEY, supra note 34, at § 1697; WIEL,
sup'ra note 68, at 638. In Whitmore v. Utah Fuel Co., 26 Utah 488, 73 P.
764 (1903), however, the court held that the measure should be the cost
of purchasing a like water right for delivery to the same land.
121. KINNEY, aupra note 34, at § 1698; WIEL, eupra note 68, at § 638. Of course,
if the crop is only a partial failure, an additional deduction would be made
for the crop which was produced. Petrofesa v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.
Co., 110 Utah 109, 169 P.2d 808 (1946).
122. KINNEY, upra note 34, at § 1698.
123. 294 F. 597 (8th Cir. 1923).
124. Merrill v. Bishop, 74 Wyo. 298, 287 P.2d 620, 626 (1955); the plaintiff will
be entitled to injunctive relief if he has a right to divert any amount of water
even if some of the water right has been abandoned. Louth v. Kaser, 364
P.2d 96 (Wyo. 1961).
126. Mitchell Irrigation Dist. v. Whiting, 59 Wyo. 52, 136 P.2d 502, 608 (1943).
126. Miller v. Hagie, 59 Wyo. 883, 140 P.2d 746 (1943).
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suffer irreparable harm.1"7 The danger of a multiplicity of
suits is also present where one appropriator threatens to
continue to divert water claimed by another. If a junior appropriator threatens and intends to wrongfully divert or
pollute waters claimed by a senior appropriator, the remedies at law would be inadequate to prevent the injury from
occurring.2 8 Finally, an injunction may be the only means
by which a senior appropriator can in effect recover the use
of water which has been wrongfully diverted or polluted. As
was shown above, the common law or statutory action of ejectment apparently does not lie to recover the use of water. If
the senior appropriator is denied this legal remedy, then an
injunction should certainly be issued.
The court will, however, balance the equities in determining whether to grant an injunction or simply damages. 29
The Wyoming court has also further restricted the situations
in which an injunction will issue in a water dispute by applying the maxim that "he who seeks equity must do equity".
This rule was applied to deny an injunction to compel a ditch
corporation to supply water to a consumer when the consumer
had not tendered or paid proper assessments.'
If a plaintiff seeks an injunction and then goes further
and requests a determination of the extent and priority of a
water right, the Wyoming court will treat the action as a suit
to quiet title.131 The pleading and jurisdiction questions will
then be governed by the rules of quiet title actions.
CONCL-SION

The unique nature of an appropriative water right
causes a number of procedural problems when it is forced
into forms of action which were originally designed to protect
different kinds of rights and property. The purpose of this
comment was to alert the Wyoming practitioner to some of
these problems, point out the consequences and propriety of
127. Lee v. Brown, 357 P.2d 1106 (Wyo. 1960).
128. Brown v. J. C. Penney Co., 54 F. Supp. 488 (D. Wyo. 1943).
129. Hillmer v. McConnell Bros., 414 P.2d 972, 973 (Wyo. 1966); Comment,
8upra note 108, at 551.
130. Henderson v. Kirby Ditch Co., 373 P.2d 591 (Wyo. 1962); McHale v.
Goshen Ditch Co., 49 Wyo. 100, 52 P.2d 678 (1935).
131. Hunziker v. Knowlton, 78 Wyo. 241, 324 P.2d 266 (1958).
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bringing certain forms of actions and seeking different types
of relief, and indicate possible solutions to procedural problems which have not yet confronted the Wyoming Supreme
Court.
THOMAS TONER
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